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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
 In this appeal, we determine whether a defendant can 
count toward the service of his supervised release term a period 
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of time he is fugitive, that is, absent from the court’s 
supervision. The statutory provisions governing supervised 
release do not contain plain language—or indeed any 
language—that expressly resolves that question. But, as the 
majority of Courts of Appeals to address the question have 
concluded, a defendant does not in fact serve his supervised 
release term while he deliberately absconds from the court’s 
supervision. Accordingly, a defendant’s supervised release 
term tolls while he is of fugitive status.  
 
Defendant Donte Island appealed to challenge the 
District Court’s order revoking his supervised release and 
sentencing him to a term of imprisonment. Island primarily 
contended that under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) the Court’s 
jurisdiction terminated at the end of his three-year supervised 
release term. Island asserted the Court accordingly lacked 
authority to revoke his release based on his involvement in a 
police officer shooting first raised to the court a few days after 
those three years had passed. The government maintained the 
Court had jurisdiction to revoke Island’s supervised release for 
the officer shooting violation based on an earlier-issued 
warrant for unrelated violations. We have no occasion to 
resolve that jurisdictional dispute, however, because we join 
the majority of Circuits that have addressed the issue to hold 
Island’s supervised release term tolled while he was fugitive 
from the court’s supervision. As a result of that tolling, Island’s 
term of supervised release had not yet expired when the later 
warrant was issued. Because the District Court therefore had 
jurisdiction over the second warrant and underlying petition of 
violation, we will affirm. 
 
I. 
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Following a jury trial in 2004, the District Court 
sentenced Island to 110 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ 
supervised release for possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Island commenced that three-year 
supervised release term on June 26, 2013, and it was scheduled 
to end on June 25, 2016. 
 
Island completed the first two years of his release term 
without incident, but on September 18, 2015, Island’s 
probation officer filed a petition of violation. The petition 
alleged Island had breached the terms of his release by 
committing several technical, i.e., noncriminal or minor, 
violations, such as failing to notify his probation officer of a 
changed address and failing several drug tests. The petition 
noted that “[m]ore troublesome” among the violations was 
Island’s failure to report to his probation officer. App’x 34. The 
officer relayed that Island “ceased reporting as instructed” on 
July 17, 2015, after which his “whereabouts [were] unknown.” 
App’x 34, 28. The petition chronicled over half a dozen 
attempts to contact Island in the coming months, none of which 
were successful. Island failed to report for a scheduled 
meeting, then did not respond to phone calls, voicemails, 
letters, or emails sent to him at several possible numbers and 
addresses. The Court issued a warrant on the basis of that 
petition the day it was filed, but that warrant remained 
outstanding.   
 
 On June 27, 2016—just over three years after Island’s 
supervised release term had begun—the probation office filed 
a second petition of violation, styled as an “[a]mended” version 
of the first. App’x 35. The Court again issued a warrant the 
same day, now based on a new violation. The second petition 
alleged Island had committed a serious violation of the terms 
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of his release on June 21—just under three years after Island’s 
supervised release term had begun—by firing a weapon at two 
police officers, hitting one. Island was arrested and taken into 
custody by Delaware County authorities that day. The District 
Court held a teleconference with the government and Island’s 
counsel soon after receiving the petition, and the parties then 
agreed to delay a hearing on both petitions of violation until 
after the disposition of Island’s Delaware County charges. 
Island was convicted in July 2017 of attempted murder and 
other charges, then sentenced in the Court of Common Pleas of 
Delaware County, Pennsylvania to 33 to 100 years’ 
imprisonment.  
 
 The District Court held a supervised release revocation 
hearing on December 13, 2017. The government sought the 
statutory maximum revocation term of 24 months’ 
imprisonment; at the hearing, it stressed the severity of the 
officer shooting underlying the second violation petition. The 
government further emphasized Island “wasn’t within hours of 
completing his sentence on this. . . . He was 11 months a 
fugitive, right, so it’s not like he committed the crime on the 
11th hour.” App’x 57–58. In response, Island emphasized he 
would already be serving 33 to 100 years in prison and argued 
“it would be excessive and unnecessary based on the practical 
realities of his case” to also enforce a revocation term of 
imprisonment. App’x 62. The court imposed the government’s 
recommended revocation sentence of 24 months, to run 
consecutively after Island’s state sentence, on the basis of only 
the second violation petition. Island now appeals.1 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction over the original charges 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and over the supervised release 
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II. 
Island asserts on appeal that the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) to revoke his supervised 
release because the warrant underlying revocation—based on 
the shooting—was untimely issued after the three-year 
calendar on his supervised release term had run. The 
government responds that the earlier warrant for unrelated 
technical violations endowed the District Court with ongoing 
jurisdiction, but also contends the warrant was timely because 
Island’s three-year supervised release term was tolled while he 
was of fugitive status. We may “affirm on any ground 
supported by the record,” United States v. Mussagre, 405 F.3d 
161, 168 (3d Cir. 2005),2 and we will here affirm on the basis 
that fugitive tolling of Island’s supervised release term 
rendered the second warrant timely.   
 
A. 
We begin with an overview of the purpose of the 
supervised release scheme before turning to how fugitive 
tolling supports that scheme. Congress designed supervised 
release, laid out in 18 U.S.C. § 3583, to be “a form of 
postconfinement monitoring overseen by the sentencing 
                                              
violations under 18 U.S.C. § 3583. This court has appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
2 The parties dispute the appropriate standard of review for the 
question whether the District Court had jurisdiction under 18 
U.S.C. § 3583(i) to revoke Island’s supervised release. 
Because we affirm the District Court’s decision on a different 
ground, we have no occasion to resolve that dispute.  
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court.” Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 696–97 (2000). 
“[T]he supervised release term constitutes part of the original 
sentence, and the congressional intent is for defendants to serve 
their full release term.” United States v. Buchanan, 638 F.3d 
448, 455 (4th Cir. 2011). As the Supreme Court has explained, 
“Congress intended supervised release to assist individuals in 
their transition to community life. Supervised release fulfills 
rehabilitative ends,” providing “individuals with 
postconfinement assistance” through the supervision of the 
court. United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000). The 
court can provide such assistance because, “[w]hile on 
supervised release, the offender [is] required to abide by 
certain conditions,” Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. at 697, 
such as regularly reporting to a probation officer, pursuing 
schooling or work, and refraining from further criminal 
activity, see U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). 
Congress authorized supervising courts to revoke supervised 
release and order reimprisonment when defendants fail to meet 
their release conditions. See id. § 3583(e); Johnson v. United 
States, 529 U.S. at 697.  
 
 The plain language of the supervised release statutory 
provisions is, contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, silent on 
how a defendant’s failure to comply with release terms effects 
the running of his sentence. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583, 3624. 
Though those provisions do not expressly provide for tolling 
when a defendant absconds from supervision, fugitive tolling 
furthers the purposes of the supervised release scheme. See 
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994). When a 
defendant under supervised release fails to meet release 
conditions by absconding from supervision, a court cannot 
effectively oversee his transition to the community. The 
majority of Courts of Appeals to address this question have 
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accordingly determined a defendant’s term of supervised 
release is tolled during the period he is of “fugitive” status, i.e., 
fails to report and comply with the terms of his postrelease 
sentence. See United States v. Barinas, 865 F.3d 99, 106 (2d 
Cir. 2017); United States v. Buchanan, 638 F.3d 448, 453–58 
(4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Murguia-Oliveros, 421 F.3d 
951, 954 (9th Cir. 2005). But see United States v. Hernandez-
Ferrer, 599 F.3d 63, 67–68 (1st Cir. 2010) (declining to adopt 
fugitive tolling for supervised release).  
 
The fugitive tolling doctrine reflects two key principles 
that align with the purposes of supervised release. First, the 
rehabilitative goals of supervised release are served only when 
defendants abide by the terms of their supervision—those 
goals are not served simply by the passage of time during the 
release term. “Mere lapse of time without imprisonment or 
other restraint contemplated by the law does not constitute 
service of sentence.” Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 192, 196 
(1923). A supervising court cannot offer postconfinement 
assistance or ensure compliance with the terms of release while 
a defendant is truant. See Barinas, 865 F.3d at 107 (reasoning 
that measuring a supervised release term “by rote reference to 
a calendar” is “inconsistent . . . with Congress’s goals in 
requiring supervised release”); Murgia-Oliveros, 421 F.3d at 
954 (“A person on supervised release should not receive credit 
against his period of supervised release for time that . . . he was 
not in fact observing the terms of his supervised release.”).  
 
Second, the fugitive tolling doctrine reflects the settled 
principle that defendants are not generally credited for 
misdeeds, such as failing to comply with the terms of 
supervised release. See Buchanan, 638 F.3d at 452 
(recognizing the “general rule that ‘when the service of a 
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sentence is interrupted by conduct of the defendant the time 
spent out of custody on his sentence is not counted as time 
served thereon’”) (quoting United States v. Luck, 664 F.2d 311, 
312 (D.C. Cir. 1981)); United States v. Crane, 979 F.2d 687, 
691 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining the fugitive tolling doctrine 
enables courts to avoid “reward[ing] those who flee from 
bench warrants and maintain their fugitive status until the 
expiration of their original term of supervised release”). As the 
Second Circuit noted, the fugitive tolling doctrine corresponds 
to a variety of procedural doctrines that prevent rewarding 
fugitive defendants for misconduct: fugitive defendants are 
barred from invoking statutes of limitations, see 18 U.S.C. § 
3290; appeals can be dismissed if defendants abscond, see 
Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 239 (1993); 
and defendants may not credit toward a term of imprisonment 
time when they have escaped from prison, Corall, 263 U.S. at 
196. See Barinas, 865 F.3d at 107–08. 
  
Because the fugitive tolling doctrine helps realize the 
design and purpose of supervised release, we join the majority 
of circuits to have considered the question and recognize a 
supervised release term tolls while a defendant is of fugitive 
status. A defendant cannot count toward his sentence time 
spent out of the court’s supervision as a consequence of his 
own doing. At the same time, the defendant’s absence does not 
free him to violate the terms of his supervised release without 
consequence; the defendant remains responsible for his 
violating conduct.3 Fugitive tolling does not lift the conditions 
                                              
3 As the Fourth Circuit explained: 
When a defendant absconds while on supervised 
release, his absence precludes the sentencing 
court from exercising supervision over him. 
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of a defendant’s supervised release, but instead recognizes the 
goals of supervised release are not served when defendants 
deliberately fail to follow its conditions.  
 
This conclusion follows readily from our existing law. 
We considered the application of tolling doctrines to 
supervised release in United States v. Cole, 567 F.3d 110 (3d 
Cir. 2009), where we held supervised release would not toll 
when a defendant was deported as a condition of supervised 
release. We noted deportation is a statutorily-contemplated 
condition of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), and 
reasoned “[i]f a defendant is removed and ordered excluded 
from the United States as a condition of supervised release, 
how can it be that the period of supervised release is tolled 
during that period?” Id. at 115. We compared that unsuccessful 
deportation tolling argument to 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), which 
expressly provides for tolling of a supervised release period 
where “the person is imprisoned in connection with a 
                                              
Tolling is necessary in that instance to ensure 
that, upon being apprehended, the defendant will 
be subject to judicial supervision for a complete 
term. However, that does not mean that a 
defendant who has absconded thereby nullifies 
the terms and conditions of the supervised 
release order during his flight. Rather, the terms 
and conditions remain in effect, and the fugitive-
defendant is not at liberty to embark on a 
“holiday” from them. To the extent that this 
result may seem harsh, it is the defendant’s own 
misconduct which creates it. 
Buchanan, 638 F.3d at 458; see also Barinas, 865 F.3d 
at 109. 
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conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime” for at least 30 
days. That comparison demonstrated Congress had considered 
two circumstances in which the defendant would be outside the 
court’s supervision—deportation and imprisonment—and 
determined how that difference would affect the running of the 
supervised release term. In the case of deportation, where the 
defendant’s distance from supervision results from Congress’s 
design in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), the defendant would get credit 
for time served; while in the case of imprisonment, where the 
defendant’s own actions lead to interruption of the release 
term, the release term would toll.  
 
We find unconvincing the reliance of Island and the 
dissent on Cole to contend imprisonment is the only context in 
which supervised release may be tolled. We found “persuasive 
Cole’s argument that the canon of expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius suggests that where Congress has explicitly allowed 
for tolling only when the defendant is imprisoned on another 
charge, it does not intend for district courts to toll supervised 
release under any other circumstance.” 567 F.3d at 115. The 
First Circuit similarly depended on the expressio unius canon 
in rejecting the fugitive tolling doctrine. See Hernández-
Ferrer, 599 F.3d at 68. But as noted, Congress explicitly laid 
out how imprisonment and deportation would affect the 
running of a supervised release term. We accordingly inferred 
in Cole that in addressing deportation and treating it as a 
condition of supervised release, Congress determined tolling 
should not then apply. But Congress did not address at all 
whether tolling principles should apply when a defendant is 
fugitive from the court’s supervision.  
 
Indeed, Congress was silent on the question. While the 
dissent suggests that silence counsels in favor of proscribing 
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fugitive tolling, we note, as some of our sister Circuits have, 
“[t]he normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress 
intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a 
judicially created concept” such as the one that a defendant 
cannot profit from his misdeeds, “it makes that intent specific.” 
Midatlantic Nat. Bank v. New Jersey Dep’t of Env. Protection, 
474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986); see Barinas, 865 F.3d at 109 (“[W]e 
typically expect a clearer expression of an intention to override 
such longstanding precepts as the principle that a fugitive 
should not profit by his unlawful or contumacious conduct.”); 
Buchanan, 638 F.3d at 456 (“We find no indication to suggest 
that Congress considered the issue and intended to preclude the 
judicially created doctrine of fugitive tolling in the supervised 
release context.”); cf. Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 52 
(2002) (drawing “no negative inference from the presence of 
an express tolling provision” in one section of the Bankruptcy 
Code “and the absence of one in” another section, where the 
differing treatment “would be quite reasonable”). Recognizing 
tolling only in the single case of imprisonment would in fact, 
as our sister Circuits have explained, “impede achievement of 
Congress’s stated goals for supervised release.” Barinas, 865 
F.3d at 109. 
 
Our reasoning in Cole accords with the premises of 
fugitive tolling and reflects the distinction between defendants 
who deliberately defy the conditions of supervised release and 
those who leave the jurisdiction not on their own but at the 
government’s order. Accord Barinas, 865 F.3d at 109–10 
(describing the running of a term during deportation as a “far 
cry from the circumstances in which [the defendant] was to 
remain in the United States for supervision and instead fled, in 
violation of the conditions imposed on him”); Buchanan, 638 
F.3d at 457 (explaining fugitive tolling is “distinguishable” 
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from the decision not to toll during deportation “because the 
fugitive-defendant’s absence arises from his own misconduct. 
The same cannot be said about a defendant who has been 
removed from the country by government order”). Cole 
confirms a defendant cannot profit from his own misdeeds; the 
fugitive tolling doctrine reflects that principle.  
 
Finally, the dissent contends 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) 
precludes fugitive tolling. Section 3583(i) reads: 
 
The power of the court to revoke a term of 
supervised release for violation of a condition of 
supervised release . . . extends beyond the 
expiration of the term of supervised release for 
any period reasonably necessary for the 
adjudication of matters arising before its 
expiration if, before its expiration, a warrant or 
summons has been issued on the basis of an 
allegation of such a violation.  
We have held “§ 3583(i) is in fact jurisdictional and thus not 
subject to equitable tolling,” United States v. Merlino, 785 F.3d 
79, 86 (3d Cir. 2015), but that holding does little to help Island 
because fugitive tolling is not based in Section 3583(i)’s 
jurisdictional grant. Section 3583(i) concerns the extension of 
a court’s jurisdiction, but it is undisputed that a court has 
jurisdiction during the defendant’s service of his supervised 
release term. We here begin with the question whether Island 
in fact served his supervised release term. Because, as we have 
explained, a defendant does not serve his term while fugitive, 
part of a fugitive defendant’s term remains to be served. During 
the remainder of that supervised release term, the district court 
correspondingly has jurisdiction. As the Second Circuit has 
Case: 17-3826     Document: 003113169722     Page: 13      Date Filed: 02/26/2019
14 
recognized, it is not “§ 3583(i) itself” which “authoriz[es] the 
tolling of the supervised-release period based on the 
defendant’s fugitive status.” United States v. Barinas, 865 F.3d 
99, 109 (2d Cir. 2017). Instead, as discussed, “such tolling is 
consistent with the traditional principle that an absconder 
should not benefit from his fugitivity and is consistent with 
Congress’s sentencing scheme of supervision to facilitate the 
defendant’s transition to a law-abiding life in free society.” Id.  
 
B. 
 For at least the period between the court’s issuance of 
the first warrant for violating supervised release in September 
2015 and the shooting leading to Island’s apprehension by law 
enforcement in June 2016, Island was of fugitive status.4 As 
Island’s probation officer timely notified the court and the 
government confirmed at the revocation hearing, Island 
repeatedly failed to report for scheduled meetings and drug 
tests. Island did not respond to the officer’s many attempts at 
contact in different media and at different addresses.5 Under 
                                              
4 To the extent Island suggests the fugitive tolling doctrine 
poses administrability problems because the precise date a 
defendant becomes fugitive may be difficult to ascertain, such 
concerns are overblown—and not at issue in this case. We note 
the Ninth Circuit has applied the fugitive tolling doctrine for 
decades without noteworthy administrability problems. See 
United States v. Ignacio Juarez, 601 F.3d 885, 886 (9th Cir. 
2010); Murgia-Oliveros, 421 F.3d at 954.  
5 In fact, had Island actually been under the court’s supervision, 
the first warrant following technical violations of his 
supervised release could have been executed.  
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the fugitive tolling doctrine, Island cannot count those months 
spent outside the court’s supervision toward his supervised 
release term. Accordingly, when the second warrant for 
violation of supervised release issued on June 27, 2016, it fell 
well within the tolled term. We therefore need not consider 
whether the first warrant endowed the District Court with 
jurisdiction over the unrelated later violations alleged in the 
second warrant. Because the second warrant was issued within 
the supervised release term properly accounting for fugitive 
tolling, we will affirm the trial court’s revocation of supervised 
release.  
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
The Majority opinion focuses on the goals of supervised 
release and concludes that tolling for fugitives from supervised 
release is appropriate.  I believe this is incorrect for two 
reasons.  First, the proper focus should be on the plain language 
of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i), which states that the court has the 
power to extend the term of supervised release only when a 
warrant is issued prior to the expiration of the term of 
supervised release.  Second, two precedential opinions of this 
court—United States v. Merlino and United States v. Cole—
should lead us to conclude that tolling does not apply.  Thus, 
tolling does not apply and the District Court was without the 
power to extend the term of Island’s supervised release based 
upon tolling.   
 
Section 3583(i) grants the court the power to extend 
supervised release “beyond the expiration of the term of 
supervised release for any period reasonably necessary for the 
adjudication of matters arising before its expiration if, before 
its expiration, a warrant or summons has been issued on the 
basis of an allegation of such a violation.”  18 U.S.C.  
§ 3583(i).  By its plain language, a court has the power to 
adjudicate matters after the expiration of supervised release if 
a warrant or summons had been issued before the expiration of 
supervised release.  There is no dispute that the District Court 
here issued the warrant after the technical term of supervised 
release expired.  When faced with a similar issue we held in 
United States v. Merlino that § 3583(i) is “in fact 
jurisdictional,” and thus cannot be equitably tolled. 785 F.3d 
79, 86 (3d Cir. 2015).  I suggest that, in light of the express 
statutory directive of § 3583(i) and our opinion in Merlino, the 
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Majority’s holding that “a supervised release term tolls while 
a defendant is of fugitive status” is wrong.  Maj. Op. at 9.  
 
In addition, Congress did incorporate tolling under 18 
U.S.C. § 3624(e) for periods of imprisonment,1 but has not 
incorporated tolling for fugitive status.  We must determine 
whether Congress’ silence regarding tolling for supervised 
release is evidence of its intent to preclude or include tolling 
for fugitive status. See, e.g., Coffelt v. Fawkes, 765 F.3d 197, 
202 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 
129, 136 (1991)) (considering “textual and contextual 
evidence” to resolve congressional silence).  The expression of 
one exception is often, but not always, evidence of the 
exclusion of other exceptions.  See Marx v. General Rev. 
Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 381 (2013) (“The force of any negative 
implication, however, depends on context.”) (citing expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius). Expressio unius applies if it is “fair 
to suppose that Congress considered the unnamed possibility 
and meant to say no to it.”  Id. (quoting Barnhart v. Peabody 
Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003)).  In essence, if Congress 
incorporated an exception to a rule, and in doing so would have 
considered other exceptions, but failed to include them, then 
we should presume Congress intended to exclude them.  
 
That is the case here. Section 3624 is an express 
exception to § 3583. At a minimum, § 3624 is evidence that 
Congress considered tolling, and nonetheless only found 
                                              
1Section 3624(e) provides: “A term of supervised release does 
not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned in 
connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime 
unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 
consecutive days.”  18 U.S.C. § 3624(e).   
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imprisonment to be an adequate justification.  More telling is 
that, as the First Circuit noted, “the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984, which . . . codified prior case law that provided for tolling 
when a probationer was imprisoned for another offense, [] 
made no similar reincorporation of prior case law” for fugitive 
status. United States v. Hernandez-Ferrer, 599 F.3d 63, 68 (1st 
Cir. 2010).2  “If Congress had wanted to authorize tolling when 
an offender absconds from supervision, we believe that it 
would have said so.” Id. 
 
We have reasoned similarly and reached the same 
conclusion in the deportation context. In United States v. Cole, 
                                              
2 Prior case law in the probation context lends further support 
to the conclusion that Congress intended § 3583(i)’s warrant 
requirement to govern the extension of a term of supervised 
release for fugitivity.  In United States v. Martin, the Tenth 
Circuit addressed a defendant who absconded from federal 
supervision for three years, and determined that the period of 
supervision “tolled from the time the New Jersey court issued 
its violator warrant until the time Martin was returned to 
federal supervision after release from the Colorado state 
prison.” 786 F.2d 974, 975 (10th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added).  
Similarly, in Nicholas v. United States, the Ninth Circuit held 
“the five-year probationary period prescribed by section 3651 
was extended by operation of law by the amount of time within 
the five-year period during which a probationer, in violation of 
the terms of his probation, and for whom an arrest warrant has 
issued, has voluntarily absented himself from the jurisdiction.” 
527 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir. 1976) (emphasis added).  In both 
cases, and just like under § 3583(i), the issuance of a valid 
warrant was a prerequisite to the court maintaining jurisdiction 
for an offender who absconded from supervision.  
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we held that the District Court plainly erred when it ordered 
the defendant’s supervised release be tolled during the period 
he is removed from the country.  567 F.3d 110, 117 (3d Cir. 
2009).  The Majority contends that the fugitive tolling doctrine 
“follows readily from our existing law,” Maj. Op. at 10, since 
“Cole confirms a defendant cannot profit from his own 
misdeeds,” Maj. Op. at 13. Far from confirming the fugitive 
tolling doctrine, in Cole we reasoned appropriately, and 
contrary to the Majority, that if tolling has not been provided 
for, it is not authorized: “Congress has provided for an 
exception to this rule in only one situation: where the defendant 
is imprisoned for more than 30 days for another conviction . . . 
the canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius suggests that 
where Congress has explicitly allowed for tolling only when 
the defendant is imprisoned on another charge, it does not 
intend for district courts to toll supervised release under any 
other circumstance.” Cole, 567 F.3d at 114–15.  The fact that 
tolling for fugitive status, as opposed to tolling for deportation, 
is a “traditional principle,” Maj. Op. at 14 (quoting United 
States v. Barinas, 865 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir. 2017)), makes it 
more, not less, likely that it would have been contemplated and 
incorporated by Congress. 
 
 While the Majority suggests that defendants would 
receive a windfall without a tolling provision, the opportunity 
to benefit from absconding is small.  “If an offender absconds 
before the expiration of his supervised release term, he will not 
do so with impunity.”  Hernandez-Ferrer, 599 F.3d at 69.  As 
long as the Government issues a warrant before the expiration 
of the term of supervised release, it may extend the term of 
supervised release “for any period reasonably necessary for the 
adjudication of matters arising before its expiration[.]” 18 
U.S.C. § 3583(i).  And because absconding from supervision 
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is, on its own, grounds to revoke supervision, there is little 
excuse for the Government failing to issue a timely warrant in 
most circumstances.  Although it is possible for an eleventh 
hour violation to go unpunished, such a circumstance is rare 
“given the ease with which the statute can be satisfied,” United 
States v. Janvier, 599 F.3d 264, 268 (2d Cir. 2010), and such 
is the nature of jurisdictional statutes.  See Dolan v. United 
States, 560 U.S. 605, 610 (2010) (describing the prohibition of 
a jurisdictional statute as “absolute”).  And in such a case, the 
only disadvantage to the Government occasioned by adhering 
to § 3583(i) is that the new warrant must stand on its own, i.e., 
it is a warrant for a violation of law, not a violation of 
supervised release. 
 
 The ease and clarity of the current regime of a defined 
term of supervised release only makes the decision to permit 
tolling for fugitivity more troubling, especially considering the 
difficulties associated with defining a “fugitive” in the 
supervised release context.  Contrary to the Majority’s 
assertion, Maj. Op. at 14, n.4, in the Ninth Circuit, district 
courts have extended the deadline of supervised release for 
“merely [] failing to comply with the terms of supervised 
release.”  United States v. Ertell, Case No. 1:11-cr-00278-SAB 
2016 WL 7491630 at *3 (E.D. Cal. December 29, 2016) 
(quoting U.S. v. Murguia-Oliveros, 421 F.3d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 
2005)).  As a result, the clock may stop and start again when, 
for example, a supervisee fails to immediately notify his 
supervisor of a change in address, but does so a week later, fails 
to show up for a drug test, but calls his supervisor two hours 
after the missed appointment, and misses a required Alcoholics 
Anonymous meeting, but shows up to the meeting the 
following week.  The best answer to these complex factual 
questions is found in the certainty of the text of the statute: “as 
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long as a warrant or summons issues before the expiration of 
the term, an offender who remains a fugitive will still be 
subject to the court's jurisdiction once located, and his conduct 
while a fugitive will be considered at sentencing.”  Hernandez-
Ferrer, 599 F.3d at 69.  Instead, the Majority’s judicially 
created exception to § 3583(i) transforms a “minimal burden,” 
Merlino, 785 F.3d at 85, on the Government into an onerous 
task for the courts, and a complicated regime for the supervisee 
in attempting to determine the applicable period of tolling, and 
thus, when his term of supervised release ends.  
 
* * * 
 The First Circuit correctly noted that, “[i]n the end, this 
dispute boils down to a matter of statutory construction.” 
Hernandez-Ferrer, 599 F.3d at 66.  Congress chose not to toll 
when a person absconds from supervised release, and in the 
absence of clear congressional intent, the plain language of § 
3583(i) should control.  Moreover, requiring the Government 
to fulfill the minimal burden of issuing a warrant before the 
expiration date is preferable to creating a new amorphous 
exception to a strictly jurisdictional statute.  Thus, I 
respectfully dissent and would vacate the sentencing order and 
remand to the District Court for further proceedings.3  
                                              
3 I can only speculate as to what those proceedings might entail. 
There would remain the issue of whether the Court would re-
sentence Island believing that it had jurisdiction over the 
violation contained in the June warrant based on the earlier 
September warrant issued for factually unrelated violations. 
See Maj. Op. at 3–4. I would conclude that it does not have 
jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 883 F.3d 
1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 2018) (concluding an earlier warrant does 
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not provide jurisdiction for factually unrelated violations). Of 
course, the Court could then consider whether to sentence 
Island for the violations alleged in the September warrant. It is 
unclear whether the Court previously did so. The District Court 
found that Island had committed those violations but stated that 
it chose “not . . . to impose punishment[.]”App. 69. It may have 
done so knowing it would impose punishment based on the 
later warrant.   
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